George was a good man. While his friends were visiting night clubs and having riotous affairs, George had been sexually intimate with only three women. Fearing disease, he had chosen and guarded two of the women carefully to ensure that they would never infect him with syphilis. Imagine his horror then when he discovered an ulcerous lesion on his genitals. Reluctantly, George confronted his worst nightmare: he had syphilis. The doctor's recommendation was simple: 'It was: To love but one woman, to take her as a virgin, and to love her so much that she would never deceive you.'
6 young women did meet young men with whom they became sexually intimate after a short acquaintance in the dancehalls and the car did become linked with prostitution.
For reformers and the middle class, these shifts were troubling on two levels. First, the rise of dating among middle-and upper-class youth resulted in class mixing which made it difficult to distinguish between the respectable and unrespectable. Secondly, dating resulted in a reversal of gender roles. Traditionally, American courtship patterns had allowed women, or at least their families or employers, to control and supervise encounters. During the nineteenth century, women, or their parents or employers, invited men to call upon them in their parents' or employers' homes; this allowed families, employers and to some extent, women, to control these meetings. Dating shifted this pattern as 'men became the hosts and assumed the control that came with that position'. 13 This reversal in gender roles as well as the blurring of visible class boundaries was deeply disturbing.
For those who dismissed these concerns, the war provided dramatic evidence of a decline in sexual morals. High levels of VD had been found among recruits and '[m]edical men working among the troops found that there [wa]s gross ignorance and mis-education on the whole subject of sex'.
14 While the creation of the Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) in 1917 sought to curb 'the sexual impulse ... through instruction, exercise, and wholesome entertainment', many felt that the war and its aftermath would simply exacerbate the spread of vd. 15 In the wake of the war, these concerns were validated. Throughout the 1920s, the Wassermann Test, which allowed physicians to diagnose syphilis, became increasingly common.
7 led many Americans to assume that syphilis was on the rise. But this was not the only problem caused by the spread of the Wasserman Test; because the test often produced false positives, vd seemed omnipresent.
Implementing the Chamberlain-Kahn Act
To address what they perceived of as an epidemic of vd, Congress passed the Chamberlain-Kahn Act. The Act, which became law on 9 July, 1918, included the appropriation of two million dollars to fight vd as well as 'the establishment of a division of venereal disease in ... the Public Health Service'. 17 Headed by C. C. Pierce, an assistant surgeon general, the PHS's Division of Venereal Disease sought to prevent and control the spread of vd within the United States. Twenty per cent of the Division's funds were spent on 'repressive measures', as the PHS termed them, while ten per cent were spent on administrative costs. 18 The bulk of the funds, fifty per cent, were spent on treatment. Clinics were built and maintained according to strict guidelines; male physicians treated only male patients and female nurses treated only women. Given the inaccuracy of the Wasserman Test as well as the secretive nature of syphilis, the scanty records kept by the PHS do not and cannot provide any real insight into the impact this treatment policy had on vd rates. Moreover, despite the financial weight given to treatment, the PHS clearly viewed their educational programs, which received twenty percent of the funds from Chamberlain-Kahn, as the most important aspect of their campaign. 19 Education, the PHS believed, could best protect the nation by ensuring that there would be no need for treatment in the future.
By 1919, fifty different free PHS pamphlets on sex and vd were available to the public. 20 These Venereal Disease Bulletins covered a range of topics; sex education within schools and churches, druggists' responsibility to provide customers with accurate information, and the special dangers which confronted girls in industry, were just a few of the topics discussed.
Because the PHS believed, as did most Americans, that the male sexual drive was stronger than its female counterpart and that men and boys were in greater danger of succumbing to their sexual urges and thereby spreading vd, most PHS pamphlets were directed at boys and young men. However, a significant number of pamphlets were sexually neutral, intended for use by civic leaders and parents, while a small segment was aimed directly at girls and young women. Two of the most popular of these were On
Guard and To Girls in Industry about the Enemy at Home. The first of these was for both middle-and working-class girls while the second was only for working-class girls. This latter group was believed to be most in danger of contracting and spreading vd.
These pamphlets were publicized during November of 1918 through selected mailing lists. In response to these mailings, 'the bureau was flooded with' requests for pamphlets. 21 The PHS distributed over five million copies of the various Worries regarding the graphic nature of these films, which included staged scenes in brothels as well as scenes of seduction, meant that these films were shown primarily to adult audiences in community settings and commercial theatres. Films were advertised widely in newspapers and they were often shown over a period of several days in large communities. Gradually, the censors limited access to these films and the films disappeared during the early 1920s.
Believing that sex education should begin before adulthood, the PHS produced their own sex education films for adolescents. Given the lack of centrality in the American school system, the PHS could not force school districts to use the films; however, requests to the PHS for information about these films indicate that the films were shown in classrooms across the county up until the 1930s.
While these films appear to have been popular, the limited availability of movie technology probably meant that the placard campaign reached more Americans. The information available through this campaign was also shaped by concerns about gender.
Placards for women were intentionally 'condensed' and vaguer than those directed at men. 29 Additionally, the public demand for male placard sets as opposed to those for women was almost 7 to 2, meaning that women were much less likely than men to see a PHS sponsored sex education placard. 30 
Creators and Consultants
The Commissioned Corps of the PHS directed and controlled the most important programmes of the Service. As regulations forbade women from becoming commissioned officers, the PHS's sex education campaign was created by male officers. Overall, the PHS did not have a firm rein on their consultants. This may have been intentional. The PHS believed that, while the war on vd required consultants to present a united front, there could be variations in how this message was pitched.
The flexibility given to those who used the programmes stemmed from several factors.
First, the PHS recognized that their audiences were diverse, including girls and women in rural and urban areas, girls from the middle and working classes and girls from immigrant and native-born communities. Allowing those who used the programmeteachers, lecturers, social workers, and medical practitioners-to adjust it to reflect their audience's needs was essential. Secondly, because the social hygiene movement predated the federal government's sex education programmes, many private organizations had already developed their own programmes. These groups were sometimes reluctant to 13 advocate PHS' message wholesale. Organizations such as ASHA preferred instead to distribute their own versions of the PHS programmes such as Youth and Life. In doing so, ASHA absorbed printing and distribution costs. For the PHS, whose budget was limited, this was a fair trade-off as it allowed a wider audience to hear and learn the PHS's lessons.
Reluctant Partners: PHS and the General Federation of Women's Clubs
Prince Morrow, the founding father of the social hygiene movement, had once said that 'the question of social hygiene is a woman's question'. 35 And physicians and legislators had long acknowledged that 'whenever they are interested in any health legislation or health education, they [must first] ask their wives … to bring these topics before the women's clubs ... [as] this will assure their success'. 36 Additionally, as Nancy Tomes has pointed out, the newly developing field of 'health education', which included sex education, was becoming an increasingly female-dominated profession during the early twentieth century. 37 With this in mind, the PHS recruited women's clubs to help in their sex education campaign. There were several reasons for their doing so. First, having been instrumental in helping to pass the 1906 Food and Drug Act, the General Federation of Women's Clubs (GFWC) had come to believe that it had an obligation to promote health-care laws.
As Bettie Sippel, the GFWC's president put it, 'just as [woman] has always been the guardian of her family's health, so must she be in the broader life of today, the guardian of the community's health'. 38 Sex education, with its emphasis on public health and the family, was a natural fit for the GFWC. Secondly, the PHS clearly sought to make discussions of vd socially acceptable. The recruitment of women's clubs was central to 14 this as clubwomen were generally drawn from the middle or upper classes. Any campaign to which they gave their support would assume the social status these women held (or so it was hoped). Thirdly, women's clubs were perfectly structured for a grassroots campaign. The national organization could coordinate the programme, issuing suggestions and serving as a liaison between clubs and the PHS while local clubs focused on specific activities. 39 The effectiveness of women's clubs during the 1920s is somewhat in dispute. Nancy
Cott points out that the 'General Federation of Women's Clubs seemed to decline in vigor' during this period. 40 However, it was not so much a decline in vigour as an overconfidence in their ability to follow a multi-faceted agenda which caused problems for the GFWC. The federation had several programme branches and the branch which focused on 'public welfare' included many public health issues. Among these were narcotics addiction, infant and child mortality, public health nursing, tuberculosis, mental hygiene, the push for yearly medical exams, eugenics/sterilization issues, occupational therapy and vd. The GFWC's limited financial resources made success in multiple areas difficult, if not impossible.
Further compounding the problem was the fact that there were no clear-cut goals for any of these issues. In 1905, the GFWC had pushed for passage of a specific law but, with the exception of the GFWC's interest in eugenics and sterilization, no one law was the target of the public health campaigns which the GFWC pursued during the 1920s. This was especially true for the campaign against vd. While communities could call for the destruction of red-light districts-a very specific task-this was seen as only a partial solution to the problem. Equally problematic was the belief of both the PHS and the GFWC that 'the responsibility for sex education rest[ed] mainly on home, school and church'. 41 No one law could intervene in any of these arenas and neither the PHS nor the GFWC would have advocated laws which called for government intervention in these arenas even if such a law was possible. As a result, the GFWC's efforts to address vd were fragmented.
Additionally, the structure of the GFWC-a loose umbrella organization of clubs 43 In contrast to these minimal efforts in Arkansas, some clubs, such as those in New York, reported no activities or even discussions regarding sex education.
If local clubs were reluctant to tackle the problem of social hygiene directly, so, too was the national organization. The GFWC noted that, while 'the social hygiene problem is a community responsibility', in other words, a responsibility which fell under the aegis of the GFWC, it also pointed out that 'this problem is one of great magnitude'. 44 Careful study was necessary before the problem could be addressed and even when this study had been completed, the GFWC could only be expected to address one 'important phase [of the problem] each year'. 45 In other words, the national GFWC was able to duck direct confrontations with this issue.
This avoidance was possible because the efforts of the PHS regarding the GFWC were not very aggressive. In many ways, there was fertile ground for a strong relationship between the two. Many clubwomen were physicians or social workers who were already interested in both sex education and social hygiene; Katherine Bement Davis, the prominent sexologist, was a clubwoman, as was Jane Addams, the founder of Hull House and an active member of various social hygiene societies. Others had strong social ties to the medical community. Lucy Booth Cumming, the wife of the PHS Surgeon General, Hugh S. Cumming, was an active clubwoman and on a local level, doctors' wives were likely to be clubwomen. And the GFWC had programme branches which dealt specifically with public health issues. Finally, women now had the vote and had already demonstrated a strong desire to ally themselves with political movements and federal agencies. It seems likely, in other words, that the GFWC would have been receptive to a close relationship with the PHS. 46 The PHS had created a strong relationship with the YMCA, an organization which was, in many ways, very similar to the GFWC in structure, but this strong relationship rested on a concrete plan. In their work with the YMCA, the PHS focused on a specific exhibit, directed at a narrowly defined audience, male adolescents. The task which PHS asked the GFWC to perform during the 1920s was radically different. There was no specific set of charts to be shown; no one pamphlet to be distributed; and more important, there was no one target audience. This made it difficult for the PHS to create a specific agenda for the GFWC to implement.
While the PHS' efforts to recruit female-oriented community organizations to help in their campaign were most effective with the GFWC, they did not limit their efforts to this group. The PHS also requested the aid of the YWCA and the Red Cross. None of these groups, however, saw their mission as tightly connected to PHS's sex education campaign as the GFWC did.
Crafting the Proper Image of Women
While the GFWC and other groups sidestepped the question of vd, the PHS issued pamphlets and directives which provided families and communities with information about these diseases. Their message was a simple one: universal continence would eradicate vd. Arguing that 'sex energy must be controlled and directed', the PHS never denied the sexual instinct. 47 Rather, they simply insisted that healthy sex could exist only within the confines of marriage. Jeffrey Moran has pointed out that by 'locating the deepest human satisfactions in marriage ... sex educators [could] accept the new philosophy of pleasure seeking without sacrificing their central assertion that extramarital and premarital sex were forbidden'. 48 In many ways, this view reflected general 'concepts of sex education in the early part of the twentieth century [which emphasized] ... the need for … both sexes … to remain 'pure' until marriage'. 49 But, while purity for men required self-control, purity for women was not dependent on a woman's actions. Predicated 'on the [Victorian] notion of the passionless, dutiful woman', sex education for women tended to focus on men's behaviour. 50 This reflected a common belief among many Americans that male promiscuity was not only a pervasive problem across the country but that this behaviour also spread disease. into immoral relations more out of curiosity than because they are "bad" at heart'. 54 The PHS focused on keeping these girls safe.
Failure to do this would, the PHS believed, result in an epidemic. Insisting that '90 percent of infections are due to women and 10 percent to men', PHS officers maintained that it took only one infected woman to spark an outbreak of vd. 55 The clearly demarcated models to which they should adhere-this was crucial in an era in which women's roles were in flux. Secondly, by creating and endorsing simple and contrasting images of women, the PHS streamlined and clarified their message. By refusing to acknowledge that women could have sex outside of marriage and still protect themselves, the agency avoided the moral ambiguities raised by prophylaxis while presenting a simple solution to the venereal disease problem. Finally, the PHS's endorsement of this traditional dichotomy should be seen as part of their overall strategy in advocating sex education. In calling for communities, schools and even families to provide sex education, the PHS was taking a radical step. While other groups, such as ASHA and the YMCA, had created and implemented sex education programmes, the PHS's call for sex education was more controversial. 61 As a government agency, the PHS needed to please not only Americans who were calling for sex education but also their more conservative counterparts. 20 The use of this divisive imagery meant that young girls and women needed to be protected, both from corrupt women as well as male seducers. 62 But, as sexual mores loosened in the early 1920s, the number of girls 'needing protection' seemed to broaden and grow. To safeguard these girls, the PHS called upon parents, specifically mothers, to teach 'the facts of life in a clear way'. By teaching their children about the 'sacredness of reproduction', mothers would prevent 'the noisome weeds of vulgarity and obscenity
[from] grow[ing]'. 63 Children who received the proper information from their parents would grow up able to control their sexual appetites. 64 Properly taught, girls would know how to say no-while boys, who learned about self-control from their mothers, would never ask girls for sex. 65 Across racial and ethnic boundaries, mothers could save their formed from … mama's blood and that's why mama's hands are so white and mama's cheeks so pale'. Having 'give[n] her own life blood to make' baby, the mother sacrifices herself in a gesture vaguely reminiscent of Christ's sacrifice. 68 The deeply conservative nature of this story stemmed from the PHS's desire to restore traditional values through the use of traditional images.
To become a good mother, then, women needed to be prepared to make sacrifices. But, according to the PHS film, Personal Hygiene for Girls, women embarking on motherhood also 'need[ed] brains, fidelity and sound training'. 69 Motherhood was not, in other words, a position which should be assumed lightly. In fact, neither marriage nor motherhood were about the needs and desires of the individual. Rather, both were and always should be about the demands of society. Thus, Rachelle Yarros suggested that women contemplating marriage-and ultimately, motherhood-ask themselves: 'Am I physically, morally and mentally fit and worthy?' 70 For both Yarros and the PHS, sex education could re-shape the family, not only by changing the roles assumed by mothers, but also by discouraging the unfit from reproducing. Defined in terms of their relationships with men, these idealized wives and mothers were a stark contrast to the 'thousands of women who are selling their bodies' and infecting weak men with vd. 74 Unlike the mother whose sacrifices contributed to the nation's well-being, the sexually promiscuous girl destroyed the nation's health. She was,
as On Guard so aptly put it, ' more dangerous to her country than the Germans behind the machine guns'. 75 For the PHS, the battle for sexual purity and the model family was a battle for America's soul and independence.
In keeping with this idea, their literature drew heavily on war imagery. Thus, one PHS pamphlet spoke of 'hidden submarine attacks on innocent wives and children' which inflicted 'slow deadly wounds'. 76 This imagery was further emphasized by the dichotomy which the PHS created between the 'innocent . In her study of the PHS's 'war' on syphilis in Chicago during the 1930s, Suzanne Poirier points out that by using the term war, 'health officials and journalists … characterize [d] syphilis as a tangible enemy that was formidable but not invincible'. 80 Certainly 
Shaping the Campaign for Women
The lofty nature of the PHS's goals-to re-shape the family, to change social and sexual mores and to arrest the spread of vd-meant a stunningly ambitious programme. It also meant that this programme would prove impossible to implement. During the mid to late 1920s, the PHS's sex education campaign sputtered and ultimately died. The reasons for its death are not, however, linked solely to the overly ambitious goals of its creators.
The PHS's programme fell victim to a series of broader changes in American society.
Primary among these were declining concerns regarding vd. In the early part of the century, leading social hygienists, such as Prince Morrow, had launched the fight against vd. Headed by dynamic leaders, this campaign was an expression of changes in the biomedical world, the advent of germ theory and the bacteriological revolution, as well as the push by progressives to battle social problems in American society. Fears regarding vd climaxed during World War I when concerns about the health of Americans were at their highest. After the war, these concerns waned, resulting in a steady decline in discussions about the disease.
As these fears lessened, federal funding for these programmes also declined. 83 While the PHS had attempted to create programmes which would be taken up and therefore funded by grass-roots agencies, they failed to create the momentum necessary to carry this battle forward. Without the PHS's support, women's clubs and community organizations dropped the campaign-which had never been overwhelmingly popular.
Further hastening the death of this campaign was the belief of its supporters that sex education was best taught within the home. Americans have never been comfortable with candid and public discussions about sex and sexually transmitted diseases. During the 1920s, as the PHS's constant reminders to Americans of the dangers of 'mock modesty' attest, this discomfort was even more pronounced. 84 Unfortunately, this constant injunctions worked to undermine the message which the PHS sought to impart. By telling people that they should feel no shame in discussing venereal disease, the PHS indirectly reinforced the idea that there was something shameful about this subject.
While none of the PHS's sex education programs during this period can be said to have been a success, its programme for young boys, Keeping Fit, was, in some ways, more effective, at least in terms of reaching large numbers, than their programme for girls and women was. Although it had no discernable impact on vd rates, Keeping Fit reached several million boys, providing some of them with sex education for the first time. While the PHS did not consistently maintain exact figures regarding the number of girls who saw their program, records indicate that the girls' program reached fewer people, simply because fewer pamphlets and materials were distributed and fewer lectures were scheduled.
Keeping Fit reached this wide audience because, unlike the campaign for girls and women, the YMCA required their young members to view the program. The PHS also aggressively advertised their boys' program to high schools and while they could not force a school district to use Keeping Fit, the PHS's rush to provide lecturers to interested schools meant that many districts adopted the program. 85 No such efforts were made on behalf of the girls' programmes, which meant that they were rarely shown to high school students and even more rarely shown to members of the YWCA.
Keeping Fit also proved easy to advertise and use because it, unlike the program for girls, revolved around one message. Using lectures, placards, and a pamphlet, Keeping
Fit pitched a simple and highly uniform message-one which was believed to be applicable to boys and young men of all ages and from all social classes. But when it came to creating a similar and highly uniform program for girls and young women, the PHS failed to do so. As a result, even the pamphlet campaign, Youth and Life, which had been created to parallel Keeping Fit, fizzled, reaching only a small audience.
Further complicating the situation was the PHS' reliance on volunteer organizations.
With Keeping Fit, the PHS had established a partnership with the highly professional YMCA. While the YMCA used volunteers, their work for the PHS was done by salaried workers whose expenses were reimbursed. The deep coffers of the YMCA allowed them to match and sometimes exceed the funds provided by the PHS, which meant that they could stage repeated showings of Keeping Fit and advertise these showings widely.
Unfortunately, when the PHS attempted to create a similar programme for girls and women, they relied on organizations whose members were volunteers and whose coffers were extremely limited. Like most women's organizations, the GFWC was chronically short on funds, and its members, both working women and home-makers, could not devote their time fully to the GFWC. Lacking both a strong financial incentive from the PHS as well as a professional staff, these volunteer organizations were incapable of reaching a broad audience.
The greatest difficulty with the PHS's programme stemmed, however, from their poor timing. Believing that male sexuality was stronger than its female counterpart, the government saw its first and most important task as creating sex education programmes for boys. Thus, Keeping Fit and the parallel push to change male sexual behaviour were developed in the first two years of the Chamberlain-Kahn Act-when funding was at its highest level. Youth and Life, however, was developed in 1922-when funding had already begun to decline. Underfunded and poorly marketed, Youth and Life never became the focal point for the PHS' sex education campaign for women in the way in which Keeping Fit became the focal point for its campaign for boys.
While the PHS's campaign failed to alter the sexual behaviour of young women, failed to reverse the recent sexual revolution and failed, most importantly, to restructure the American family, the programme should not be dismissed as unimportant. The materials which the PHS developed for this campaign continued to be used in a sporadic fashion throughout the late 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, this campaign set the standard for sex education in the twentieth century. Following the pattern set by the PHS during the 1920s, federally funded sex education continued to be divided along sex lines throughout most of the century and to advocate the role of continence, with women expected to serve as the brake in most sexual encounters. 22 Ibid, p. 271. 23 PHS believed that local communities should handle most of the campaign and this included keeping tallies on the lectures given.
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